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Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to give a pre-
liminary analysis of the role of information in the 
development of the military. The military is ex-
amined as an informational environment within a 
human ecosystem.  An informational environment 
contains potential physical, biological, social and 
cultural sources of information, as well as relevant 
actors who manipulate and potentially produce 
varying qualities of information (see Casagrande, 
this volume).  The position of the military within 
such an informational environment is primarily 
due to its status as a fundamental institution in 
the modern Nation State.  While the specific ex-
ample used here is the U.S. military, the scope of 
analysis is broad and general, and might be applied 
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Abstract
The historical development of military organization in the United States has been strongly influenced by the 
desire to make more precise information available to decision-makers at appropriate levels in the chain of 
command for national security and warfare.  By placing the U.S. military in national and international 
contexts, this paper proposes that its historical development results from the complex informational needs 
critical to the political-economic evolution of the State.  Specifically, technology, strategy, chain of command 
and battlefield tactics increasingly require improvements in information quantity, quality and analysis.
Eric C. Jones
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Can a system designed for achieving and maintaining a long-term political consensus also make and carry 
out decisions inevitably marked by urgency, secrecy, and often contention? . . . Can any U.S. institution long 
survive which lies outside the consensus? 
–Schmitt 1986:282-3
to military institutions in other times and places. 
The centrality of the military to social orga-
nization in the U.S. is often noted, but little un-
derstood.  Past explanations have characterized the 
military simply as a capitalist tool, or as necessary 
for national security, tending to ignore the role of 
information in its development.  An alternative 
approach examines the existence, construction and 
maintenance of informational boundaries.  Histori-
cally, these boundaries range from the development 
of civilian/military distinctions to intra-service 
(enlisted/officer) and inter-service (Marines/Air 
Force) distinctions of identity, which constrain 
potential information transmission. 
Here I briefly trace the development of the 
U.S. military as related to complex informational 
 1This paper carries over ideas developed in Charles R. Peters’ seminar in Information Ecology held at the University of 
Georgia in 1997.  Some of these threads were developed further in Peters’ 1998 Complex Systems and 1998 Information 
Ecology II seminars.  While the author is solely responsible for oversights, Charles Peters, Felice Wyndham, David Casa-
grande, Suzanne Joseph, Rick Stepp, George Luber, Rebecca Zarger and Warren Roberts have all made useful contributions.
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needs in the evolution of the State. First, a history 
of U.S. military intelligence activities provides a 
background for understanding the role of infor-
mation in the modern State. Next, the U.S. mili-
tary’s connections to external environments (e.g., 
geopolitical, economic, biophysical) are placed in 
a systems perspective.  This is followed by an enu-
meration of military functions, and remarks on 
cross-cultural and cross-temporal developmental 
tendencies.  I conclude with an overview of the 
internal workings of U.S. military intelligence.
History of U.S. Military Intelligence
At the beginning of the 20th century, the 
United States had virtually no centralized body to 
coordinate military intelligence activities.  Ameri-
can beliefs in pluralism and decentralization limit-
ed the possibility for such centralized coordination 
(Powe 1973).  Nonetheless, a powerful structure 
for acquiring and analyzing information now exists 
in the United States; one which emphasizes both 
hierarchy and flexibility; the former for efficiency 
in command, the latter for unexpected events or 
the exploitation of unconventional information 
sources.
Technology for communication and intel-
ligence, especially mapping, has had a cumulative 
effect in the organization of the military, creating 
specific military and non-military branches of in-
telligence.  Although localized tactical intelligence 
has been demonstrated by American commanders 
in all wars, the Civil War demonstrated a lack of 
coherence in military intelligence on both sides 
(Powe 1973).  Informational improvements in 
the ability to command troops during the Civil 
War were made possible by the technologies of 
the railroad, hot air balloon and telegraph.  These 
improvements withered during the post-war era, 
and as with previous wars, there was little peacetime 
follow-up of wartime organizational developments. 
For example, it was not until the 1880s that the U.S. 
dispatched permanent foreign military attachés, after 
military leaders visited Europe and brought back an 
interest in military staff organization.  
At the turn of the century the middle class in 
the United States began to seek power and leader-
ship through management skill and technology 
(Powe 1973).  This was expressed in ‘scientific’ 
management, bureaucratization, centralization, 
and an emphasis on expertise as the appropriate 
impetus for social change.  Along these lines, Major 
General Ralph H. Van Deman helped create the 
Military Intelligence Section of the War College 
Division during WWI.  His vision was of a profes-
sional intelligence service:
The most necessary and essential kind of 
information, the information without which no 
war plan can be made that is worth the paper it 
is written on, does not come in of its own accord 
or as a matter of routine.  It must be actively 
sought, traced out, and proved up. (Van Deman, 
in Weber 1988:141)
Van Deman, in those formative years, always 
sought to maintain the separation of military 
intelligence activities from strategic military ac-
tivities.  He envisioned the Military Intelligence 
Section as an agency responsible for the central-
ization of information and analysis (Table 1), as 
a separate institution accountable directly to the 
war chiefs of staff, and separate from the heads of 
planning, supplies, operations, etc. (Powe 1973; 
Thomas 1986).
Since WWII, civilian control over intelli-
gence apparati has waxed and waned a number of 
times.  Formalized in 1947, congressional control 
of intelligence included the creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), emerging from the 
WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  The 
1950s and 1960s were characterized by congres-
sional deference to executive initiatives concerned 
with foreign policy.  In 1974, Congress bounced 
back, reacting to CIA covert actions.  Congress 
placed covert actions under presidential control and 
demanded notification.   This period of imposing 
restraint on intelligence activities was followed by 
one of restricted Congressional influence, requiring 
notification of only two Congressional committees 
before action instead of eight, and prohibiting the 
press from publishing the names of any intelligence 
officer (Schmitt 1986; Allard 1991).  
Present distribution of resources in military 
intelligence is uneven.  Loch Johnson asserts that 
material technology’s evolving role in U.S. military 
intelligence is evidenced by the fact that the CIA 
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and the other twelve U.S. Intelligence Agencies 
are “ . . . bloated bureaucracies, overly reliant on 
technology and in need of a game plan for the 
post-Cold War era . . .” (cited in Koppes 1998:6). 
He argues that we should aim for a 2:1 spending 
ratio of technology to people.  Presently the ratio 
is 7:1.  This lopsided distribution of resources 
can be traced to political influences; for example, 
the emphasis on data-gathering techniques.  The 
president, as civilian head of government, checked 
by Congress, often appears to have no choice but 
to follow the dictates of the military-industrial 
complex.  White House staff organization is a key 
for a president to affect distribution of resources 
for intelligence activities by Congress (Lord 1988). 
However, the influence of politics on distribution 
of resources partially depends on the presidential 
style of management.  A strong, activist president 
can make these agencies and the National Security 
Council serve his/her needs to a greater extent.  The 
National Security Council (NSC) has a number of 
responsibilities aimed at strategic planning.  The 
NSC answers directly to the president, who then 
issues directives or proposes legislation regarding 
the structure of the intelligence community.  The 
informational responsibilities delegated to the 
National Security Council’s policy groups now 
include routine staff support and information, 
crisis management, policy development, policy 
implementation, policy advice and operations 
(Lord 1988:63).
One of the classic public concerns in the 
U.S. has been with the role of secrecy and intel-
ligence in public and private life. Citizens cannot 
perform their democratic responsibilities if igno-
rant, and Congress cannot fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities if it is lacking military information. 
Self-restraint was encouraged for the press during 
WWI (largely ineffectual) and heavily pushed 
during WWII2 , starting eight days after war was 
declared on Germany.  However, censorship of the 
press predates the country’s independence3.  For 
management of press access to government and 
intelligence information, presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower created the categories: ‘top secret;’ 
‘secret;’ ‘confidential;’ etc.–classifications of govern-
ment data for managing information at the source 
(Wiggins 1956:101).  By the present decade, as 
demonstrated during the Gulf War, the press has 
seen even more restrictions and opted for even 
more self-restraint, unlike in the Vietnam War.
tABle 1: eArly u.s. militAry iNtelligeNce Activities (powe 1973).
2Roosevelt’s announcement claimed: 1) the necessity of withholding some of the news where it originates; 2) the necessity 
of guarding the nation’s borders to not allow information to reach the enemy; 3) the necessity of prohibiting publication 
of some information even within the U.S.; and 4) the importance of conformity by the press and radio to abstain from 
revealing certain details, such as troop and carrier movements (Wiggins 1956:97).
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
27 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 3 1999
Military Functions
Modern military functions can best be seen 
in a simplified case study, presented here in the 
form of graphic models to illustrate the players 
and relationships in these military systems. Build-
ing on this, comparisons can then be made with 
prior social forms of military-like behavior and 
forms of warfare that have evolved in the past few 
thousand years.
The United States of America’s Warpath
Figure 1 is a triptych that depicts the rela-
tionship between function and development of 
the military in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and introduces some of the players in the multiple 
environments (physical, biological, social, cultural) 
external to the military. The U.S. government 
interacts with the rest of the world through the 
‘western system of alliances.’  This inevitably leads 
to war, wartime production, and martial law (three 
panels on left of Figure 1), and eventually back to 
the ‘balance of power’ for a new cycle.  It is impor-
tant to understand the place of the U.S. military 
in national and international politics in terms of 
these continual pressures.
With regard to the preeminent nature of 
warfare, Martin van Creveld has noted that:
. . . in order to explain the occurrence of war, 
it is not necessary to postulate the existence of 
any ulterior objectives other than war itself. 
(1991:215)
To repeat, the true essence of war consists not just 
of one group killing another, but of its members 
readiness to be killed in return if necessary. 
(1991:221)
From an evolutionary point of view, this 
aspect of tribal warfare does not seem to have 
changed much when war was bureaucratized, or 
further rationalized, as chiefdoms or states grew 
in size.  While we often think of the State, or any 
organizational body, as being either at war or at 
peace, it seems that no such complete division 
between war and peace is very useful to the State, 
as expressed in Figure 1.  A shaky ‘balance of 
power’ (i.e., peace) is compromised by the way in 
which people and institutions are ready to jump 
on ‘the warpath,’ when it appears that a new cycle, 
precipitated by economic or political duress, is in 
the making.
The next two sections provide functional 
explanations for the existence of a professional 
military, and a third section provides an evolution-
tABle 2: FuNctioNs oF the moderN NAtioN stAte militAry.
3In 1725, Massachusetts ordered Boston newspapers not to print anything related to military activities without seeking 
governmental consent (Wiggins 1956:94).
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Figure 1: the wArpAth.  
For a key to symbols see Stepp, this volume, Appendix D. There exists an ever-present potential source of war in the ‘balance of 
power’–a world-society type of pluralism.  With a shaky balance of power, even arms speculation can give impetus to start on ‘the 
warpath.’  Starting in the middle of the figure, the triad of the President/Congress-military-intelligence community is constrained 
by the ‘western system of alliances,’ as well as by the tradition of ‘development of underdevelopment,’ which is the world capitalist 
system’s reliance on permanently feudalistic and non-capitalistic relations of production.  Shaded areas represent changes or evolution 
in the nature of a population or institution.  Countries targeted for underdevelopment can be the focus of: 1) U.S. propaganda of 
legitimizing a puppet government through democracy; 2) an unequal trade relationship; or 3) an extremely exploitative relationship 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
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with capitalist institutions, which often results in riots, revolution, and other reasons for the U.S. to go to war, or provide a coun-
terinsurgency.  The president is influenced somewhat by the press because of reporting, but this influence owes mostly to the press’ 
role as a filter of public opinion.  ‘Fighting potential’ is of concern to both the President and the Press.  The Press becomes an ally 
to military intelligence by criticizing foreign governments and maintaining jingoistic hype in order to increase revenues.  When a 
country (regional power, revolutionary country, etc.) is engaged by the U.S. in war, they return to the ‘balance of power’ through a 
portal, either as part of the ‘western system of alliances’ (mostly industrialized countries) or the ‘development of underdevelopment’ 
(mostly 3rd world countries).  The ‘warpath’ is joined by the U.S. governmental institutions, the press, and, eventually, the public. 
This model provides for dissipation of the ‘warpath’ through sinks.
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ary bases for such an institution.  
Wartime and Peacetime Military Functions
Although it is sometimes difficult to distin-
guish between wartime and peacetime functions, 
as can be seen in Figure 1, Table 2 attempts such 
a delineation for the modern military. 
Hyperfunctional explanations for the exis-
tence of the military are common.  For example, 
it is argued that not only does military power help 
maintain international hierarchies (Tables 3 and 
4), it also becomes a resource sink for states that 
must deal with the problem of surplus capacity for 
production (e.g., Schumpeter 1950; Wallerstein 
1974).  However, not all expenditures should be 
seen only as ‘unproductive’ employment of surplus 
personnel and equipment within the military, 
since at least two productive capacities come to 
mind.  One is the construction of public works 
and reclamation projects, for example by the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Second, in the U.S., The Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
provides civilian services by mapping coastlines, 
as well as by assisting scientists in environmental 
research. These also serve the informational needs 
of the military.
Another military effect is technological–most 
modern civilian technologies are the hand-me-
downs from military research and development. 
From intelligence have come such technologies as 
e-mail, LSD, radar and sea-bottom charts, weather 
and low-altitude satellites, rockets, lasers, global 
positioning systems, remote sensing and geographic 
information systems.  From non-intelligence tech-
nologies have come jeeps (4x4s), canned-ham, 
tABle 3: rANkiNgs oF NucleAr cApABilities4.
tABle 4: rANkiNgs oF NAtioNAl militAry resource dedicAtioN For 19954.
4Source: US Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, internet address: www.acda.gov/wmeat/
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
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dehydrated foods, vacuum-packed wrapping, etc.
Arguably, the most important non-wartime 
service provided by the military is that of protect-
ing shipping and trade routes.  Not the slightest 
fraction of present materials could flow through 
the world system without the existence of military 
forces, especially those of the U.S.
The military also performs a display function 
for the state, attaining public recognition through 
parades, bands and burials, as well as ‘showing off’ 
by having a presence in foreign countries.  In ad-
dition, in most societies, the military absorbs the 
reserve of young (age-graded) males, who might 
otherwise disrupt society with aggression, through 
competition with adults for land or productive 
responsibility, or by competing with older males 
for mates.
World Military Rankings 
In addition to being an institution of social 
organization, as just noted, military intimida-
tion functions as a source of symbolic interaction 
between citizens of different countries, especially 
given the increasingly global character of informa-
tion, migration and contacts.  Tables 3 and 4 show 
a method, though perhaps artificial, of ascribing 
rank amongst world citizens in a type of world 
pluralism5.  For instance, public perception of the 
strength of a foreigner’s country affects how a person 
may be seen vis-a-vis citizens of other countries.  A 
passport-bearer from a militarily powerful country 
generally will not be turned away in most places as 
easily as someone who presents a passport issued by 
a militarily weak country.  Tables 3 and 4 are expres-
sions of potential power.  How this information (in 
numbers or in actual, physical presence) might be 
consumed, received, or perceived by citizens and 
functionaries of various countries is of strategic 
importance to the U.S. government.
Non-State and State Military Comparisons
Table 5 compares the content, construct 
and effects of war under different types of societal 
5Other possibilities for this ascribed status include: G-7/G-15/G-22 or UN Security Council membership, preeminence of 
educational or other cultural institutions (art, press, television, entertainment, etc.).
tABle 5: Aspects oF wAr vis-A-vis societAl orgANizAtioN.
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organization, presenting a role for information in 
the evolution of military organization.
Note that the goals of the modern Nation 
State in Table 5 do not include ‘expand empire’. 
This is due to the emergence of a global system of 
autonomous states, where all geographic areas are 
identified with State-level political organization. 
Van Creveld characterizes this situation as follows:
1789 marked the beginning of a period when it 
became possible, even fashionable, to overthrow 
kings wholesale.  As this process took hold, 
the sanctity that had attached to dynasties was 
gradually transformed to national borders, and 
for one state to grant right of passage to the forces 
of another became tantamount to sacrilege.  The 
new belief system solidified after the First World 
War and grew into dogma after the Second when 
it was also enshrined into international law.  This 
made it extraordinarily difficult to use war as 
an instrument for altering borders; where the 
territorial integrity of one state is violated, all 
others feel themselves threatened. (van Creveld 
1991: 215)
This resignation to a system of legitimate units 
of competing interests resembles the realpolitik 
advocated and followed by U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s. It can also be 
noted in the shaky ‘balance of power’ shown in 
Figure 1. Clearly, the impetus for formation of a 
fighting force was not born with the Nation State. 
Nonetheless, professionalization of a fighting force 
is likely to occur when a nation faces many wars. 
Such has been the case with the development of a 
universal [inter]state system paralleling the growth 
of capitalist institutions during the modern period. 
Pressures to professionalize also occurred earlier in 
societal development when populations grew and 
there became a need for a pan-societal mechanism 
of integration as powerful as the military (Service 
1971; Carter 1977).  Table 6 elaborates this idea, 
and distinguishes the point at which a society has 
developed the military as a full-fledged indepen-
dent institution.  In the descriptions presented in 
Table 6, almost all categories show clear differences 
between State and non-State modalities of war, 
though the existence of warfare is noted in almost 
all societies (Ember and Ember 1992).  
As can be deduced from Tables 5 and 6, the 
nature of warfare has changed in both tactical and 
strategic realms.  Development of tactical opera-
tions, or battlefield practices, is affected most by 
technology.  Strategic questions, or battle plans, 
also have witnessed technological breakthroughs, 
most recently in the technologies of nuclear, bio-
logical and electronic warfare.  In the end, the 
role of information in tactical and strategic mat-
ters is increasingly important for the professional 
military, especially compared with non-State 
war-making bodies.
The Military as an Informational Environment
Command, Control, Correspondence and 
Intelligence 
Command and control of troops are basic to 
tABle 6: compArisoN oF NAtioN stAte ANd NoN-stAte modAlities oF wAr6.
6Based on Turney-High, cited in Hallpike (1988:102-4).
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military battlefield tactics, as well as to long-term 
strategy.  Key to both command and control, as 
well as to correspondence and intelligence, are 
the identifying markers which denote place and 
responsibility for every individual in the military. 
Advancement in the hierarchy means a pay raise, 
an increase in skill, an increase in prestige, and, 
typically, an increase in the number of people for 
whom you are responsible.  As sheer military force 
proves to be inadequate in some theaters of war/
conflicts, what have become more important are 
communication and intelligence.  Long-distance 
communication is especially crucial, as is the analy-
sis of the glut of data provided by intelligence and 
information gathering techniques.
Hutchins’ (1995:372) model for cognition in 
a social setting (e.g., a naval ship) includes the de-
velopment of the practitioner, development of the 
practice, and conduct of the practice.  In Hutchins’ 
application of this model to the military, develop-
ment of the practitioner results in specialization 
and increase in status in small, graded increments, 
based on glamour, technology, destructive power, 
extent of training, quality of people, and the dif-
ficulty involved in gaining entrance.  Specialization 
is not so extreme for officers as it is for the en-
listed.  Identity also is forged by encouraging some 
units to think that other units in the command 
are not as competent.  Pride and confidence are 
paramount to maintaining cohesion and identity, 
with concomitant execution of responsibilities. 
The conduct of the practice is governed by succes-
sive hierarchical responsibilities and witnessed in 
the salute, uniforms and insignia that express the 
just-mentioned delineation in status (Hutchins 
1995).  The development of the practice in the 
U.S. is based on the division of labor between the 
services, leader/soldier relationships of reciprocity, 
and the operational requirements of the transport 
and fighting arena, be it air, sea or land (Hutchins 
1995; Allard 1991).  
This model of information flow and cogni-
tion in the military can be used to organize future 
research.  Table 7 lists apparent gaps in past and 
present studies of military intelligence.  Points 
one, two, five and six relate in different ways to 
development of the practice and of the practitio-
ner, while points three and four relate to conduct 
of the practice.
Political/Defense/Intelligence ‘Faultlines’
Lord (1988) identifies three ‘faultlines’ affect-
ing U.S. national security, which result from the re-
lationships between information gathering, defense 
considerations and relevant policy development: 1) 
tABle 7:  ideNtiFied gAps iN studies oF militAry iNtelligeNce.
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political-military; 2) political-intelligence; and 3) 
military-intelligence (Figures 2 & 3).  Faultlines 
develop because the president, a civilian leader, is 
dedicated to domestic concerns, requiring disclo-
sure, as well as foreign diplomacy, requiring secrecy. 
The president attempts to influence contingency or 
strategic planning through the National Security 
Council, though this traditionally is the domain of 
a War Department.  In Figures 2 and 3, the absence 
of an economic ‘wheel’ and economic faultlines is 
due to this paradigm’s concern with Nation State 
organization, and because economic contexts and 
functions were already presented in Figure 1, ‘The 
Warpath.’
Figures 2 and 3 are based on Lord’s (1988) 
presentation of these faultlines/disjunctures in 
the U.S. government’s national security struc-
ture.  The three relevant government objectives 
for national security are depicted: 1) ‘control by 
7This term and “objective control” come from Samuel Huntington (Lord 1988:45). “Subjective” refers to the mutual influ-
ence of the military and the government on each others policy and internal workings. “Objective” refers to the separation 
of the military and government in terms of internal workings, where overall policy objectives are set by the government 
and followed by the military.
military;’ 2) ‘activity through politics;’ and 3) 
‘secrecy in intelligence.’ 
The political-military faultline appears in 
Figure 3 as ‘subjective control7,’ owing to the fact 
that the military influences civilian agencies and 
planning (e.g., officers in the National Security 
Council), and that politics influences internal 
military affairs (e.g., officers becoming experts in 
international relations). As noted earlier, however, 
the ideal since the turn of the century has been 
‘objective control,’ wherein the civilian bureaucracy 
is separated from, but has total control over, the 
military bureaucracy, which has exclusive control 
over its own internal workings.
The political-intelligence faultline in Figures 2 
and 3  starts with the CIA’s ‘objectivity,’ and results 
in the agency often discounting or questioning ad-
ministrative policy as biased. This faultline recently 
has created ‘competitive analysis,’ with several agen-
Figure 2: FAultliNes.
A synoptic sketch of the three main players at the center of Figure 1–the military, the intelligence community, and 
politicians (Congress/President), based on Lord’s (1988) discussion of the “faultlines” which develop between these 
institutions.  These faultlines are depicted as wheels with differently shaped cogs.  Sparks fly where the cogs meet.
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cies submitting competing intelligence estimates, 
rather than the CIA exercising hegemony over the 
final report for the National Intelligence Council.
The military-intelligence faultline in Figures 
2 and 3 is exhibited by: 1) military distrust of the 
CIA’s ability to provide adequate intelligence; 2) 
CIA hegemony over information analysis; 3) tech-
nology determining policy rather than vice-versa; 
and 4) a lack of adequate counter-intelligence, 
especially within military intelligence agencies.  In 
addition, surveillance work is not always well-paid, 
nor exciting and, as van Creveld states, people 
always can be “outwitted, bribed or subverted” 
(1991:211).
Within the political wheel, the president does 
not lie at the center because Congress is another 
source of power, as are the Defense Department 
and Department of State (largely under presi-
dential control, but having their own traditions). 
Also, informational campaigns for democracy by 
the United States Information Agency, Voice of 
America (or Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Ra-
dio Marti), often are not in the State Department’s 
interest of maintaining good bilateral relations 
(Lord 1988:51).  This ‘la la land,’ an attributed, 
mythological reality, is comprised of fairly autono-
mous agencies devoted almost entirely to patriotic 
propaganda.
Conclusion
The military is one of the basic social mega-
institutions in the Nation State (e.g., Cohen 1991). 
States have always been concerned with control. 
As Allard (1991:236) states, “Over any signifi-
cant length of time, the pluralistic nature of the 
American civil system is more likely to favor the 
institution than the individual.”  Pluralism exists 
in all states, though this means that political safety 
valves and continual outlets for ethnic tension and 
mass discontent also are required (Cohen 1994). 
Warfare, patriotic public displays, and jingoistic 
journalism against other countries also serve this 
end (Figure 1).  Within the State, surveillance and 
military intelligence are involutional developments, 
resulting partly from the disintegrating possibili-
ties of pluralism and information entropy, where 
different epistemological fields (i.e., worldviews) of 
different ethnic groups and professional identities 
collide and compete. Given this fact, the military 
and its related institutions may well be as funda-
mental to State functioning as the political realm.
The development of military intelligence in 
the U.S. since the late 1800s involved central-
ization, autonomy, direct accountability to war 
chiefs, intermittent civilian control, decreasing 
antagonism with the press, and the integration of 
the different armed forces.  These developments 
have been made possible and shaped by the use 
of a  ‘least common denominator’ approach to 
communication, which encompasses all interser-
vice, intraservice and civilian/military distinctions 
mentioned in the introduction.  The distinctions 
within the military illustrate that the most effec-
tive modes of information transmission within an 
organization are not always the same as the most 
effective modes of transmission between organiza-
tions.  Future research might examine types of 
communication, and their effectiveness, within 
and between intelligence or military organizations 
at different places and times.
This effort to contextualize the study of mili-
tary intelligence traces the role of information in 
the history and development of the U.S. military 
and the development of the U.S. as a polity in the 
world system.  The communication between the 
tactical systems of the armed services has improved 
in the past 25 years, but the biggest threat to effective 
and efficient military operations in the U.S. is still 
the coordination and analysis of information (Al-
lard 1991:16).  Thus, even though weapons systems 
procurement, organization for war, and distribution 
of power are also the prerogatives of each individual 
service branch, it is information that remains the 
most important variable in the evolution of this 
component of the human ecosystem.
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Figure 3. FAultliNes (explicAted). 
Partially explicated view of Figure 2; intelligence agencies denoted by the eye in the peak of the consumer symbols.  All answer 
to the CIA/Director of Central Intelligence.  Prior analytical hegemony exercised by the CIA can (and presently does) give 
way to competitive analysis of intelligence information by other agencies in forming the National Intelligence Estimates. 
Most of the flows are informational, excepting Congress’ impetus towards sinking money into defense and technology, 
presumably to absorb surplus capacity for production.  The dialectical field between military officers and their troops (who 
resemble kites), designates the contradictions wherein soldiers oriented toward group solidarity and devotion are forced 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
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through a system requiring professionalism, organization and impersonality.  Similarly, officers who believe in, and 
have a duty to, their subordinates are required to manage their troops through manipulative integration instead of 
simple dominance (Buck 1981).  Whereas  sparks flew where the cogs met in Figure 2,  the meeting of these institu-
tions has more specific results.  Distrust develops between the military and intelligence spheres, competition over 
information control develops between the political and intelligence spheres, and politicized control of the military 
results from the relationships developed between the political and military spheres.
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